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Introduction
Financial sector companies are different from those in the real sector. In the real sector the price for  
consumer goods and services is a price reflecting all costs which have been made to produce the 
output. Profits reflect the difference between the sales price and the costs base. The “guiding hand 
principle” helps entrepreneurs to make rational decisions. In the financial sector the managers do 
not produce anything else than “considered opinions”. The money entrusted to them belongs to the 
individual households. The prices quoted by the financial  sector managers are based on guesses 
about future cash flows over the funds entrusted to them. There is no clear costs concept in financial 
sector companies as only future events will determine the true costs picture. The key difference 
between the two sectors is that real sector companies work with historical costs and the financial 
sector with future costs. The difference between the two sectors is immense as no one can really 
predict what the future holds in economic terms.
In the U.S., where the combined balance sheet of individual households has been collected for many 
years, the statistics show that the financial assets net of liabilities on home mortgages and consumer 
durable goods are now 81% of total individual household assets. The remainder 19% is constituted 
by non-financial assets. This 81% was practically four times the annual personal income level of 
U.S. households in 2012. The net financial assets were also 3.5 times U.S.GDP in 2012. This figure 
alone shows the dominance of the financial sector over the real sector.
However the picture for jobs and incomes is totally different. Nearly all jobs and incomes out of 
jobs are derived from the real sector. In 2011 the U.S. financial sector employed 5.8 million out of 
the 141 million employed persons or 4.1% of the total number of people employed in the States in 
that year. About 4% of the workforce manages financial assets which are 3.5 times GDP values, 
while 96% of the labour force works in the real sector.
Job levels and disposable incomes are central to economic prosperity and they are the drivers of 
demand  levels.  The  experience  over  the  last  10  years  has  shown  that  the  collective 
(mis)management  of  financial  assets,  especially  on  the  home  mortgages  front,  has  been  the 
principal cause of the downturn in jobs and incomes. 
The collective mistakes made by the U.S. financial sector in risk taking can be exemplified by the 
fact that, over the period 2004-2012, 21.4 million households out of the 53 million households in 
the U.S. who had a mortgage were affected by foreclosure proceedings and 5.4 million of them lost 
their  homes. In all respects the individual households were the losers: on the jobs and incomes 
front; on the asset prices front as well as on the government debt front
In this paper questions will be raised why no volume control measures were put in place to control 
the  excessive  growth in  home mortgage  volumes  as  compared to  income growth of  individual 
households. Questions will also be raised about quantitative easing policies which main aim was to 
lower the costs (price) of borrowings, rather than repair the income loss to individual households -a 
volume loss-. Evidence collected from the individual household statistics over the last 5 years show 
that  individual  households  wanted  and  needed  to  repair  their  own balance  sheets  first,  before 
entering into more borrowings, irrespective of the price.
This paper aims to set out how the U.S. financial sector became the key player in causing the U.S. 
economy and with it most of the world economy to stumble and what can be done to shorten the 
adjustment period if a financial debacle affecting individual households has taken place.
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1. Real markets and financial markets
1.1 The difference in size
The real markets represent the exchanges of goods and services in a single year: GDP. The financial 
markets represent the savings built up over the years. If one takes the U.S. situation as an example, 
in 2012 personal income was running at $13.75 trillion. The net worth of individual households in 
2012  was  $64.185  trillion,  a  multiple  of  4.67  of  personal  income,  which  means  that  savings 
represented more than 4.5 years of personal income in the U.S.  If one deducts the net worth of 
individual  households  invested  in  homes  and consumer  durable  goods of  respectively of  $8.26 
trillion and $2.12 trillion, than the value of the financial assets of U.S. individual households was 
$53.8 trillion. This implies that the financial assets were just under 4 times the personal income 
level in 2012.
There has been a shift from individual households assets invested in homes and consumer durables 
to investments in financial  assets.  In the U.S. individual households had all  through the 1980’s 
about 40% of total assets in non-financial assets, mainly in households’ real estate and in consumer 
durable  goods.  Since  1990  the  distribution  between  non-financial  assets  and  financial  assets 
changed with a more rapid growth of the latter, so that currently some 31% is constituted by non-
financial assets and 69% by financial assets. After deducting home mortgages and consumer credits 
from the non-financial assets the distribution ends up at about 81% financial assets and 19% non-
financial assets as per the end of the 1st quarter 2013. The total individual households’ asset base 
grew from gross $24.4 trillion in 1990 till $83.7 trillion as per the end of the first quarter 2013.
This 80-20 distribution between financial assets and income is in stark contrast to the employment 
picture. Nearly all jobs and incomes out of jobs are derived from the real sector. In 2011 the U.S.  
financial sector employed 5.8 million out of the 141 million employed persons or 4.1% of the total  
number of people employed in the States in that year. The employment picture was that in 2011 
there was a 96-4% split in people working in other sectors as compared to those employed by the 
financial sector.
The conclusion out of the above data is that jobs are practically exclusively created in the non-
financial sectors in the U.S. economy, but in terms of importance, the financial sector outweighs 
income generation out of jobs by a factor of practically 4. Incomes are needed to add to demand 
levels in an economy, but the use of savings can undermine the creation of jobs as can be concluded 
out of the causes of the 2008 financial crisis. This will be set out in section 2.
If financial markets represent 80% and personal income 20% of total income plus financial savings, 
perhaps economists need to pay more attention to what happens in the financial markets and how 
these markets can influence the real sector.
1.2 What prices mean in the real sector as opposed to the financial sector.
In the real sector a price stands for the remuneration for a good or service delivered to the public. 
The price represents the value attached to a product or the compensation for a service delivered. 
Companies can deduct their costs from the sales price and the difference between revenues and 
costs constitutes the profit level per item and for all sold items together the net income level of the 
company. Company management can subsequently decide whether it is worthwhile to expand or 
reduce production.  In the real sector price levels  are often referred to as the guiding hand and 
correctly so.
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A price in the financial sector is a very different price from one in the real sector. In the financial  
sector a price: interest rate, exchange rate especially in the latter case a forward, future and options 
price does not represent the costs of production. The financial sector does not produce savings; 
those savings are owned by the general  public.  The only item which the financial  sector really 
produces is: Considered Opinions (CO’s). These opinions are judgements about the rate of return on 
funds borrowed from the public, whether it is on home mortgage loans, on loans to companies or to 
a  government,  or  on  the  future  developments  of  exchange  rates  and  commodity  prices.  If  the 
predictions  of  the  financial  sector  managers  -bankers,  insurers,  asset  managers,  hedge  fund 
managers, stockbrokers and pension fund managers- in foreseeing how shares, bonds, commodity 
prices and exchange rates will develop, do not materialise, the results will not appear in their own 
profit and loss accounts, but in the changes in the individual households’ net worth levels. It is  
slightly different with loans as loans stay mainly with the lending institutions. If loan losses are not 
foreseen, such loan losses will find their way into the balance sheets of banks and other financial 
institutions. However as all funds that banks use are ultimately owned by the individual households, 
the losses are all borne by the latter households. Some bankers may lose their bonuses or even their 
jobs, but the value loss on savings ends up with the individual households.
Considered opinions are provided about expected future developments. The price set for a financial 
product  reflects  an  opinion  about  the  risks  to  be  incurred  over  the  savings  provided  by  the 
individual households. Such prices could be right, but they could equally be totally wrong. The real 
“costs of production” will only show up in future years, which may be five, ten, thirty or even more 
years away. In the real sector the price in the markets is a price for an end product or service,  
reflecting the reward at the end of the production period. In the financial sector the reward is an 
uncertain future cash flow, which often stretches out over many years. Hence the price set cannot 
possibly reflect the “true costs” as such costs are simply unknown. Only in hindsight can such 
“costs” be assessed. The financial sector cannot and does not work with a “guiding hand”. However 
as the financial sector rules over 80% of individual households’ savings and incomes, perhaps the 
time has come for those, who consider financial sector institutions equal to real sector companies, to 
review their opinions.
The financial sector -manned by some of the best brains in a country- has developed a number of 
mechanisms to hide the true nature of the time period that funds need to be used. For instance take 
the introduction of new shares. Stock exchanges make it possible for companies to have their shares 
traded. Such trading does not mean that that the company involved wants to increase or reduce their 
outstanding equity capital;  it  means that one investor replaces another:  the “substitution effect”. 
Stockbrokers provide their considered opinion to their client base on which shares to buy, which to 
hold and which to sell. There is no guarantee to such advice. Stockbrokers can -and often do- make 
errors  in  their  predictions.  One  classic  example  was  the  Initial  Public  Offering  of  shares  in 
Facebook, which took place in May 2012. The introduction share price was $38.- per share and 
within the first three months the share price had dropped to half its value. 
Another example involves the banking sector. When banks agree to granting a mortgage to a young 
customer, the repayment period usually stretches out over a period of 30 years. Banks do not have 
30 year funding to their disposal, so they use the floating interest rate mechanism, adjusting their  
costs of funds to their customers on a frequent basis. Even fixed rate deals are often only fixed for 5 
years. What banks basically do is to tell their customers that the funding risks are not ones that the 
banks are willing to take, so the customers are faced with the volatility in interest rates. The true 
nature of the lending period was a 30 year period and the banks are unwilling or unable to take this 
maturity period into account. The individual household has to carry the interest rate risks. This is a 
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very  unsatisfactory  outcome,  since  individual  households  are  also  unable  to  predict  their  own 
income developments, let alone be experts on interest rate predictions.
Still another example involves governments funding their deficits. In view of the very high levels of 
government debt in most developed countries, with government debt having reached levels of 80 to 
over 100% of GDP levels, the fact is that none of these governments can repay such debts in any 
shorter period than say 70 or 80 years. The maturity of most western governments’ debt is along 
these lines. However many governments have a tendency to fund most or all of their debt on a fixed 
rate basis, rather than on an index linked basis. The latter base will provide protection to savers 
against the vagaries of inflation. Some governments rely heavily on short term paper to fund their  
government debt. The question is rarely asked whether the fund providers are satisfied with these 
approaches. It may suit some banks and insurance companies;  it certainly does not suit pension 
funds or the individual households. Again individual households are providing the funds and have 
to carry the risks of inflation. This issue will be addressed in section 4.4.
Financial products have been engineered to either protect financial asset values or to speculate on 
future outcomes. In the real sector one cannot buy a good or service with paying a risk margin only. 
In the financial sector this has been made possible and is encouraged by many financial institutions. 
Again the U.S led the way and a financial futures exchange was set up to deal in such risks. The real 
reason that such an exchange had a chance of success was that the monetary base in the U.S. was  
freed of restrictions and that as a consequence interest rate volatility and exchange rate volatility 
really  took  off.  The  rise  in  volatility  over  the  last  30  years  has  made  predictions  on  future 
developments more difficult.  Price setting in the financial sector has been and is faced with greater 
uncertainties than ever before. The chances of economies going into a decline as a consequence of 
financial markets collectively making grave errors has been increased. In the analysis below, the 
reasons for the 2008 crisis, which actually already started in 2004 in the U.S., will be described.
2 The principal causes of the 2008 financial crisis
2.1 The use of funds approach to home mortgages
Making money available  to individual  households,  especially  of the long term variety of home 
mortgages, requires a judgment on the future repayment capabilities of each individual household. 
There  are  three  aspects  to  such  lending:  the  first  one  is  that  the  judgment  represents  a  risk 
assessment. A risk assessment is different from a price in that the applied price includes the risk 
premium over costs of funds over a long period. Only future developments will show whether the 
accepted price was the correct one. The 2008 financial crisis showed that in many cases the price 
was wrong or even more importantly that based on the income levels of some borrowers no price 
would  have  ever  matched  their  ability  to  repay  their  home  loans.  For  some  5.4  million  U.S. 
borrowers, representing 10% of those having a mortgage,  there was no equilibrium price. Their 
homes  were repossessed.  40% of all  American households  having a mortgage were faced with 
foreclosure proceedings over the period 2004-2012.  
The second aspect is that the demand for homes is a finite one based on population growth and on 
the changes in the average household. 
The third aspect is that making money available for home mortgages can have two effects: the first 
one is that money enables families to acquire a home, but the second one is that if supply is not  
forthcoming in the short run in the places where families want to live, it drives up house prices. To 
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lend money which is converted into increased house prices has less impact on economic growth 
than new construction; not only that, but one may question the economic value of rapid rises in 
house prices. The gain can have two potential causes: one it reflects the scarcity value, but two it  
represents a misallocation of funds as no economic gain -a gain in output in an economy- is made 
from the rise in house prices. The latter reflects closely the “black tulip” mania in Holland in the 
17th century,  where speculation drove up the black tulip price to 3000 or even to 4150 guilders, 
when a skilled craftsman earned 300 guilders a year.
2.2 The U.S. experience
Over  the  period  2000-2006  in  the  United  States  the  combined  mortgage  debt  of  individual 
households increased from $4.814 trillion as per the year-end 2000 till $9.874 trillion as per the end 
of  2006,  an  increase  of  105.1%. Over  the  same period  the  median  income level  of  individual  
households moved up in nominal terms from $41,186 in 2000 till $47,262 in 2006, an increase of 
14.75%. If one takes into account the increase in the number of individual households from 104.705 
million  in  the  year  2000 till  114.384 million  in  2006 than the  average  amount  of  outstanding 
mortgage debt moved up from $45,977 in 2000 till $86,323 in 2006; an increase of 87.75%. The 
conclusion can be drawn that mortgage debt expanded by a factor practically six times faster than 
medium  income  levels.  This  excessive  speed  of  lending  for  home  buying  purposes  plus  the 
packaging of such home loans into daily tradable mortgage backed securities lies at the heart of the 
causes for the 2008 financial crisis.
- The national home mortgage portfolio
The amounts of $4.8 trillion in 2000 and $9.9 trillion in 2006 represent the national home mortgage 
portfolio of the U.S. in these years. The quality of the national home mortgage portfolio is strongly 
influenced  by  the  quality  of  the  borrowers.  The  graph  below  shows  the  rapid  growth  of  the 
subprime share in new mortgage originations in the years 2004-2006.
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Table 1:  Sub prime mortgage originations1
In table 2 the annual outstanding mortgage amounts are provided over the period 1996-2008 as well 
as the annual increase in outstanding mortgage amounts. Also included in the table are the house 
price inflation levels on a year over year base and the consumer price inflation levels2 over same 
period. Finally the excess of house price inflation over CPI has been displayed.
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subprime_mortgage_crisis
2 http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm
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Table 2: U.S.  Mortgages  outstanding 1996-2008,  annual increments in mortgage amounts, 
house price changes and consumer price inflation levels.
Year ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 2000 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 07 ‘08
Mortgage
amounts
x US $
trillion
3.54 3.75 4.05 4.43 4.81 5.30 5.98 6.83 7.81 8.91 9.90 10.58 10.5
Year on
Year
increase
x US$
billion
House
Price
Inflation
% y.o.y
CPI
Inflation
% y.o.y
Excess
HPI 
over
CPI %
218
2.24
2.95
-0.7
216
5.10
2.29
2.81
301
4.61
1.53
3.08
377
5.81
2.16
3.65
383
7.67
3.25
4.42
507
6.04
2.77
3.27
680
6.48
1.56
4.92
850
7.29
2.23
5.06
944
11.08
2.59
8.49
1099
10.44
3.28
7.16
990
3.33
3.12
0.21
683
-1.95
2.77
-4.72
-57
-13.3
3.70
-17
- Credit judgment errors.
When individual households get into payment difficulties on their home mortgages, the first action 
by the lenders is foreclosure, followed by a foreclosure filing and subsequently home repossessions. 
U.S. statistics on all three can be found on the website of Statistic Brain3. The credit  judgment 
problems took off in 2005 with the level of foreclosures increasing by 25% over 2004. In 2006 they 
were 90% higher than 2004 and in 2007 nearly 3.5 times the 640 000 level of 2004.The peak was 
reached in 2011 at 3,920,418 which stood at  over 6 times the 2004 level. All this led to home 
repossessions which numbered 269,000 in 2006, 489,000 in 2007, 679,000 in 2008, 945,000 in 
2009, 1,125,000 in 2010, 1,147,000 in 2011 and over 700,000 in 2012. All in all nearly 5.4 million 
credit judgement errors led to the ultimate repossession of homes. The number of households who 
had to deal  with foreclosure proceedings  amounted  to  21.4 million  households  over the period 
3 http://www.statisticbrain.com/home-foreclosure-statistics/
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2004-2012. The Milken Institute4 estimated that in June 2008 there were 53 million households 
having a mortgage and 27 million were outright owners without any mortgage. Of the 53 million 
just over 40% had to deal with foreclosure proceedings during the 2004-2012 period; a staggering 
percentage, which really showed the extent of the financial crisis for individual households.
The  credit  judgment  errors  were  compounded  by the  securitization  process,  which,  as  table  1 
showed, really took off in 2003 when nearly two thirds of new home mortgage originations were 
farmed out to the financial markets. This meant that American financial institutions were able to 
generate mortgage sales, but did not need the financial reserves as the transactions were packaged 
and sold off to, among others, overseas banks and pension funds. It is noteworthy in this respect to 
note that the Bank of Spain, Spain’s central bank, did not allow Spanish banks to buy such U.S. 
mortgage backed bonds. Regretfully, it did not stop its own country’s real estate funding disaster. 
The  securitization  method  also  made  it  very  difficult  to  deal  with  individual  clients  as  whole 
portfolios  of  clients  were  simultaneously  declared  insolvent;  hence  the  enormous  numbers  of 
foreclosure procedures compared to the number of households having a mortgage. 
- Demand for homes
The key determinant in the demand for homes is not the price but the growth in the number of 
individual households. In the period 2000-2010 the number of households grew in the U.S. from 
105.5 million to 116.7 million according to the Census Bureau5.  On average the U.S. increased the 
number of individual households by 1.12 million per annum over the period 2000-2010. Of the 
around  80  million  homes  used  all  year  around  in  the  U.S.,  the  average  lifespan  can  only  be 
estimated but is probably around 130 years, which means that the total finite demand for homes is 
somewhere around 1.7 million  new housing starts per annum. Table 3 gives an overview of realised 
annual new housing starts, seasonally adjusted for the period 2000-2013
Table 3: U.S. annual new housing starts6 per 1 July, seasonally adjusted over the period 2000-
2013
Year Housing starts
x 1,000
Year Housing starts
x 1,000
2000 1463 2007 1354
2001 1670 2008  923
2002 1655 2009  594
2003 1897 2010  546
2004 2002 2011  623
2005 2054 2012  741
2006 1737 2013 (1 September)  891 (annualised)
Elements,  which “helped” individual  households to  acquire  homes,  were the applicable interest 
rates and other loan conditions attached to the mortgages. Low starts up interest rates were used to 
entice  individual  households  to  sign  up  to  mortgages.  Such  mortgages  had  their  rates  steeply 
increased after a two year period. 100% mortgages were also used with no repayment obligations. 
In many cases short term funding rates were applied rather than a 30 year fixed rate. All these 
elements shifted the credit risks to the individual households. The latter only hoped that house price 
increases and incomes would grow faster than their payment obligations. When the lending excess 
4 http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/riseandfallexcerpt.pdf
5 http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf
6 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/HOUST.txt
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came to the boil in 2008, such hopes were shattered and not only did house prices drop rapidly, also 
income  growth  stayed  behind  CPI  inflation  levels  and,  of  course,  the  outstanding  payment 
obligations remained the same as before the crisis. Individual households reacted in a way they 
could. They reduced the total volume of the outstanding national home mortgage portfolio from 
$10.5 trillion in 2008 till $ 9.38 trillion as per the end of the first quarter of 2013. During the latter 
period an increased share of households’ incomes was diverted to paying off home mortgages as 
compared to the allocations before the 2008 crisis. This change in income allocation through paying 
off mortgage debt and acquiring new homes from own income or savings reduced the spending 
power available for buying other goods and services. This had the effect that demand levels were 
reduced. The company sector reacted in slowing down employment growth and investments as well 
as generally following a wages and salary policy of keeping wage increases below price rises. 
Reduced growth rates in companies’ turnover levels and a slower growth in households’ incomes 
led to a rapidly increasing government debt level in the U.S.
While  the  statistics  of  other  countries,  especially  on  the  financial  assets  base  of  individual 
households, is not as complete as the excellent statistics which have been collected over a long 
period in the U.S., the same financial assets and other economic principles are at work in other 
countries.
- Conclusions
The conclusions, which can be drawn, are that excessive increases in home mortgage funding in 
2003-2005 led to excessive new housing starts,  which was simultaneously accompanied by the 
highest house price inflation seen for several decades. Income growth did not keep up with the 
excessive debt increases. When the home price levels started to get close to CPI levels, as they did 
in 2006 and when at the same time more households got into financial difficulties as shown by the 
increased level in foreclosures,  the market turned around, banks became more reluctant  to lend 
themselves  as  shown  by  the  very  high  level  of  mortgage  securitisations  in  2004-2007.  The 
(international) financial markets absorbed the U.S. home mortgage risks. In August 2008 Lehman 
Brothers went bankrupt and the trust banks had in one another disappeared altogether. More banks 
were rescued, including Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac as well  as AIG Holdings.  The latter  had 
provided a huge volume of credit default swaps on mortgage backed securities to the (international)  
financial markets.
Was the U.S. national home mortgage portfolio managed, so that these excesses could not have 
occurred? The answer is no. Could it have been managed, the answer is, of course, yes.  There was 
and still is no single authority in the U.S., the U.K., and The Netherlands or in many other countries 
which  manages  the  national  home  mortgage  portfolio.  A  penalty  system  for  lenders  and 
intermediaries in the lending and securitisation process does not exist, at times when such lenders 
and intermediaries caused excessive lending levels; excessive as compared to income developments 
of  individual  households.  The current  lack of  a national  home mortgage  portfolio  management 
system  led  to  individual  households  being  penalised  either  from  foreclosures,  from  home 
repossessions or from drops in house prices after excessive gains as well  as from an excessive 
increase in government debts as a consequence of negative or slow growth economies. Individual 
households are also penalised by average wage and salary increases below inflation levels. On top 
of  all  this  they  are  also  the  ones  who  suffered  the  additional  7.8  million  job  losses  and  are 
responsible for paying back the $5.3 trillion increase in U.S. government debt since the 2009 fiscal  
year.
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3 Government responses
3.1 Actions taken
When Lehman Brothers was declared bankrupt in the U.S. in August 2008, this only represented the 
culmination of events which had been going on ever since 2004. The regulators did not regard 
house price inflation or deflation for that matter as a worry for the economy. They never intervened 
in the securitisation process of home mortgages. They just did not see the financial crisis coming. 
They allowed the investment banks to undertake transactions at extremely high gearing ratios. They 
did not manage the national home mortgage portfolio at all. What they did was to rescue Fannie 
Mae and Freddy Mac as both had taken part in the securitisation process and had their own fair 
share of doubtful debtors. They also rescued some other investment banks, some commercial banks 
and General Motors and a few other key companies.
In the U.K. Northern Rock, Lloyds TSB as well as Royal Bank of Scotland had to be rescued. Also 
in other countries bank rescues took place.
What the U.S. and the U.K. central banks also did was to start up a programme of quantitative 
easing. In the U.S. the Fed bought up over $2 trillion of mainly government debt and to a much 
smaller extent securitised mortgage bonds and some corporate bonds. Such bond buying operation 
represented some 17% of the federal debt outstanding with the public. In the U.K. the Bank of 
England bought £375 billion of government debt. For the U.K. the quantitative easing operation 
represented 37.5% of the total government debt of slightly over £1 trillion.
The reasoning behind these operations  was that by buying up bonds these central  banks would 
inject cash into the financial markets. This action might subsequently lead to making more money 
available to invest in real economy activities. What QE also did, was, of course, lower the interest 
rates applicable for government debt at a time of rapidly rising levels of such debt.
Since the 2008 financial crisis, on the banking side stricter capital requirements were formulated in 
the Basel  III  agreement.  In  the pension sector,  many companies  gave up their  support  to  their  
pension funds in  covering the inflation  (CPI or RPI) risks and switched their  pension funds to 
Defined Contribution schemes instead. In the U.K., where most civil servants pensions are non-
funded, the government continues to promise inflation proof pensions; a promise which has to be 
paid for by all individual households together through their taxes. 
The combination of quantitative easing -which lowered the interest rate levels in many countries- 
and the recession has put many pension funds under great stress, especially the ones that relied 
strongly on funding government debt. Again since 2008, many government regulations have been 
formulated in this respect.  Some concerned the discount rate,  others the distribution of existing 
financial assets over those still contributing and those already retired.
3.2 Effectiveness of actions taken
What has been surprising is that so little attention, apart from lip service, has been paid to the plight  
of  the  individual  households.  In  2008 in  the U.S.  they lost  $12.7 trillion  of  the  value  of  their 
financial assets. This amount was substantially higher than the total U.S. home mortgages portfolio 
of $10.5 trillion in the same year. Since 2008 median household income increases have been lower 
than inflation levels as the next table7 shows:
7 http://www.sentierresearch.com/Charts/HouseholdIncomeIndex_UnemploymentRate_07_2013.jpg
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Table 4
The  table  also  shows  that  unemployment  rates  have  gone  up  steeply  since  2008  and  many 
households have been faced with unemployment or are only able to work part-time.
The next  table8 will  show the drastic  changes  in the  U.S. labour  force participation  rate.  Such 
changes may hide the fact that many more people are so disappointed in seeking employment that 
they no longer bother. If this is the case and it appears to be the case as the trend line before 2008 
was relatively stable and the changes only occurred after 2008, than real unemployment levels are 
much higher than those published. Another consequence of lower labour force participation rates is 
that income out of work is reduced by the lower number of people actively participating in creating 
the gross national product. A well known side effect of the 2008 financial crisis has been that many 
more part time and lower wages jobs have been created since 2008.
8 http://www.bls.gov/cps/lfcharacteristics.htm#laborforce
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Table 5
Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey
Series Id:           LNS11300000
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Labor Force Participation Rate
Labor force status:  Civilian labor force participation rate
Type of data:        Percent or rate
Age:                 16 years and over
The pressures on U.S. individual households have come from all sources:
• Total U.S home values are to-day at the same level as in 2007. They have not increased in 
absolute  terms, notwithstanding a substantial  rise in CPI inflation levels  over the period 
2007-2013. The cumulative CPI inflation rate since 2007 has been 12.7%. U.S. households 
lost out on their main asset: homes.
• In the period 2008-2012 inclusive, new housing starts in the U.S. have numbered 3.4 million 
units. At an average price of $150,000 per house sold an estimated value would be $510 
billion. Individual households have collectively paid this amount out of incomes or savings. 
Additionally over the period 2008-31 March 2013 individual households have collectively 
repaid $1.2 trillion of principal amounts over their outstanding home mortgage portfolio. 
The combined $1.7 trillion meant that incomes which could have been used for consumption 
were used for repayment of debt and for funding new homes. The latter would normally 
have been financed from home mortgages  with repayments  to be stretched out  over 30 
years. New housing starts over the period 2008-2012 are well below the levels needed to 
accommodate the growth in population.
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• The 8% drop in seasonally adjusted household incomes from 2008 till April 2013 plus the 
nearly 3% drop in the labour force participation rate over the same period plus the increase 
in the number of unemployed since 2008, had the effect that the collective wages sum was 
under great pressure, which led to a very slow growth in consumer demand. The latter was 
also negatively affected by the funding of the new housing stock and the reduction in the 
outstanding home mortgage portfolio.
• Quantitative  easing  exercises  focussed  on  the  long  term  interest  rates  by  buying  up 
government bonds. Individual households suffered through their pension fund savings and 
sometimes  through  their  individual  holdings  of  such  bonds.  Banks  and  hedge  funds 
benefitted the most, as they were able to anticipate and act upon the expected lowering of 
long term interest rates. What could have been done is to focus on volume control measures. 
Such measures could be combined with a policy of issuing index-linked longer term bonds. 
Such a strategy will be set out in sections 4.4 and 4.7.2.
• Individual households have tried to restore their personal balance sheets. In the U.S. they 
lowered their home mortgage loans to such an extent that the owners’ equity in household 
real estate has now returned to 49.2% as per the end of the first quarter 2013, exactly equal 
to the level of 2007. They also kept their increase in borrowings level for durable consumer 
goods (+10.2%) below the inflation levels (+12.7%) over the same period. This happened 
with  a  population  growth  over  this  period  of  +3.5%,  which  implies  that  the  debt  on 
consumer  durable  goods  grew  less  rapidly  per  individual  household  than  the  10.2% 
suggests. Individual  households can only restore their  own balance sheet.  They have no 
influence on the increasing levels of government borrowings. However they are responsible 
for repaying the additional $5.3 trillion in government debt since the fiscal year 2009.
The key question to be asked is why took it so long to restore the U.S. and other economies to 
economic growth. It has been five years since the Lehman bankruptcy, but much longer since the 
start of the excessive mortgage debt growth. An attempt to answer this question will be made in the 
next section.
4. How to restore economic growth
4.1 Introduction
The financial sector in the U.S. created and organised a sales volume of home mortgages during the 
period 2003-2006, which far exceeded the repayment capacity out of incomes by the U.S individual 
households. 
Collectively the considered opinions of the banking sector and of their regulators were wrong. The 
discussion about “too big to fail” is quite irrelevant in this respect as it was not the competition level 
between banks which failed or the dominance of one or another player in the financial market. It  
was the collective action of all  financial  institutions together  in pumping money into the home 
mortgage markets at a speed which far exceeded the repayment capacity of individual households. 
It was also the ability of the banks to sell such loans to third party funders, which offloaded the risks 
on their customers to others and thereby avoided the capital requirements which otherwise would 
have slowed down the lending speed. Table 1 showed that in 2007 banks took no new mortgage 
loans on their own books, but sold all new mortgages to others; nearly all overseas investors. Again 
this was not the action of an individual bank but of all banks combined.
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If one can accept that the price mechanism in the financial sector works very differently from that in 
the real sector, than one may also accept that the “guiding hand” in having all banks deliver a sound 
national home mortgage portfolio is an unrealistic description of reality. It is not that banks are too 
big to fail, or that competition leads them to do the right thing; it is the accumulative action of all  
banks together. Such collective action determines whether the speed of lending for the purposes of 
home mortgages exceeds the income growth capacity of the individual households to absorb the 
lending volumes. Two dynamic variables -growth in mortgage lending and growth in individual 
households’ incomes- followed a divergent path with catastrophic effects.
The solution therefore needs to be found not in price control mechanisms but in volume control 
measures. As 96% of all incomes of individual households are generated from the real sector, the 
volume control measures should take place in the financial sector. The overall speed of growth in 
the national home mortgage portfolio needs to be managed.  In section 4.7.2 the macro-prudential 
measures will be worked out.
Prevention of a future crisis may be important, but it does not overcome the effects of the current  
crisis.
As  indicated  in  the  above,  the  effect  of  the  pressures  on  individual  households  was  that  they 
changed their spending behaviour after 2007. They repaid outstanding mortgage loans and paid for 
a reduced level of new housing starts out of incomes and savings. They also were confronted with 
higher unemployment levels and income growth below inflation levels. Individual households had a 
lower capacity to spend.
The U.S. government was in no position to temporarily raise individual households’ incomes as the 
last  time  it  ran  a  budget  surplus  was  in  2001.  Quantitative  easing  helped  the  financial  sector, 
especially the speculative elements of it, but such help was of little use to individual households; 
they only saw their income growth -in as far as there were jobs- grow more slowly than inflation 
levels.
The help that could have been given: temporary access to a small part of their savings from their 
pension pots was not considered. Such help from the financial sector -using individual households’ 
own savings- to overcome the drop in incomes would have been the most sensible policy. Again it 
would need to involve all pension funds in a similar way as the collective of banks need to be 
managed in the case of the national home mortgage portfolio. What and how this could work will be 
explained in the next section.
4.2 Economic easing.
Towers Watson in their global pension assets study9 have identified the following five countries, 
excluding Japan, with the highest level of pension assets in 2012. The U.S. has $16.8 trillion in 
pension assets, the U.K. has the equivalent of $2.7 trillion; Australia has U.S. $1.56 trillion; Canada 
has  U.S.  $1.48 trillion  and The Netherlands  has  $1.2 trillion.  The pension assets  of  these  five 
countries combined represent about 80% of the world’s pension assets in 2012.
These pension assets are a major part of the financial assets of their respective countries. 
9 http://www.towerswatson.com/en/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2013/01/Global-Pensions-Asset-Study-
2013
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Pension  savings  are  influenced  by  the  same  characteristics  as  all  financial  assets.  Economic 
uncertainties play the key role in assessing the future values of the assets.  Life expectancy changes 
play the most important role on the liabilities side. If bankers and the credit rating agencies cannot 
predict loan or bond losses as the past experience has shown, than pension funds have an equally 
difficult task to predict the future values of their asset base. All attempts to do so are bound to fail. 
The result is a Considered Opinion, just as valid as those of bankers, asset managers and others in 
the financial sector.
Economic easing has the intention to focus on the individual  household’s income position in a 
direct  manner.  It  differs substantially from quantitative easing practices  in  that  it  addresses the 
individual households’ income shortfalls rather than going the indirect way of quantitative easing. 
The real problem of quantitative easing was and is, is that it attacks the price of funds paid rather 
than  the  volume  of  lending.  The  analysis  of  the  U.S.  national  home  mortgage  portfolio 
developments showed that, yes of course, bankers enticed individual households to sign up to home 
mortgages with inappropriately low start up mortgage costs, but had the volume of lending been 
controlled, house price inflation would not have reached 5-8% over CPI inflation rates or dropped 
by 17% below CPI inflation rates as it did in 2008. Banks and the investing public would not have 
experienced  the  same  size  of  home  mortgage  loan  losses  as  a  consequence  of  such  excessive 
lending as compared to income levels of individual households. In other words the Fed, the Bank of 
England and the ECB all looked at the wrong variable: the price of credit rather than at the volume 
of home mortgage credits. If a system had been in place to manage the national home mortgage 
portfolio, it would have cushioned the economy against the boom-bust scenarios.
This leads back to economic easing, which aim is to support individual households in overcoming 
their income shortfall when no home mortgage volume controls are in place. This section started 
with  the  volume  of  savings  accumulated  in  pension  funds.  To  stay  with  the  U.S.  case,  U.S. 
individual households have accumulated nearly $17 trillion in savings for the purpose of having an 
income stream available during their retirement years. The future asset values of such savings are 
strongly influenced by current economic performance. Current economic performance is strongly 
influenced by individual households having the means to consume real sector goods and services, 
rather  than having to  service home mortgage  loans  at  an  excessively fast  pace  out  of  reduced 
income levels as compared to CPI inflation levels. For this reason economic easing can act as an 
economic stabiliser.
The U.S. pension funds could collectively be requested to pay out, say 2% of their asset value,  
which would mean a cash injection into individual households’ incomes of about $330 billion per 
annum till the economy has fully recovered. Such request needs to be accompanied by a shortfall 
guarantee from the U.S. government so that pension funds after the pay out would be in no worse  
position than before the pay out. The increase in households’ incomes will bring about an increased 
demand for goods and services, especially when Americans will be asked to spend the additional 
income rather than save the amounts in a “Help the Economy” campaign.
Such  cash  transfer  to  individual  households  would  represent  a  2.4%  increase  in  their  annual 
personal income levels. If such payments are made tax free, made in equal amounts to all pension 
savers and retired pension beneficiaries and spread over four quarterly instalments, the maximum 
impact on economic growth would be achieved. 
Companies will benefit, job creation will benefit, government tax incomes will benefit, individual 
households will benefit without increasing their outstanding loan volumes and finally the financial 
sector  savings  will  benefit  with  higher  share  prices  based  on  a  better  outlook  for  company 
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performance and lower home mortgage loan losses as more individual households are able to repay 
outstanding loans according to the agreed maturity  schedules.  House prices  will  also avoid the 
dramatic dips in home values.
To make economic easing a success only a full co-operation between a government and all  the 
pension fund companies will suffice. The shortfall guarantee could be exercised after a period of 
say three years and the amounts would only cover the paid out amounts plus the yields over these 
amounts based on the prevailing 10 year government bond rates. From the potential pay-outs the 
gains made by the pension funds on their shares investments over the remaining portfolio would be 
deducted.
The reason to pay all pension savers and retirees an equal amount is that the younger generation 
will have to save for a much longer period -with all the investment risks attached to it- than those 
closer to retirement or already in retirement.
Economic easing avoids the sharp increase in government budget deficits, it avoids the very costly 
adjustments to the capacity utilisation rate of the real sector and it avoids the dramatic increases in 
unemployment rates. It does not save poorly performing banks, but it counteracts the effects of the 
explosive growth in home mortgages far above the income growth speed. Economic easing will also 
result  in  companies  having  to  spend  less  on  maintaining  their  contributions  to  their  defined 
contributions schemes. It will also mean that individuals will be incentivised to join DB or DC 
pension schemes as only those saving for a future pension will benefit from the temporary pay-outs.
4.3 Quantitative easing
The reason that quantitative easing did not do the job it was supposed to do -reign in excessive 
lending growth as compared to individual households’ incomes- is that it focussed on the wrong 
variable: it focussed on the price of funds rather than on the volume of lending. The assumption that 
when the interest rate comes down the volume of lending will go up is based on a misconceived 
concept. One has just to study the borrowing behaviour of individual households over the last five 
years to see how misconceived this concept has been. Individual households collectively repaid 
more than 10% of their total home mortgage portfolio over the period 2008-2013. The Balance 
Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations as published by the Fed10 provides the evidence. 
It was made clear in the above that an acceptable volume of lending goes hand in hand with the 
income growth levels of individual households. Excessive levels of lending penalise the individual 
households  in  many ways,  including  unemployment  levels  and income growth  below inflation 
levels. The guiding hand to real sector companies led to less growth due to slow growth in demand 
with all the subsequent effects on employment and incomes. The thought that a financial sector 
solution  -printing  money-  could  solve  the  income  and  balance  sheet  problems  of  individual 
households was more than optimistic. The great majority of households only hold a connection with 
the  financial  sector  through their  home ownership and pension  fund savings.  The reduction  in 
interest  rates  did  not  help  the  40%  of  U.S.  home  owners  with  a  mortgage;  those  who  had 
foreclosure proceedings against them. It also did not help the performance of pension funds. 
The  Dutch  Social  Economic  Council  (SER)  -made  up  of  employers’  and  trade  unions’ 
representatives as well as independent experts- in its recent deliberations about the Dutch pension 
system concluded that “a lowering of interest rates at times of a recession leads to higher pension 
10 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/accessible/b100.htm
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cost covering premiums and lower pension benefits levels. In this manner a reduced interest rate in 
a recessionary period put consumer spending levels under further pressure. The pension system 
strengthens the recessionary period; it works in a pro-cyclical manner.”
Quantitative easing did little, if anything, for existing home owners with or without a mortgage. In 
the U.S. and in other countries house prices performed poorly as compared to CPI inflation levels 
ever since 2008. Only this year house prices picked up somewhat after the individual households 
had  restored  their  own  balance  sheets  by  bringing  debt  levels  in  line  with  income  levels. 
Quantitative easing did even less for the performance of pension funds. As the large majority of the 
individual households rely on house values and pension funds assets for their future income and 
have no other additional financial  resources, one has to raise the question: Was the quantitative 
easing system meant to enrich the few or the masses of the population. If its aim was the latter, the 
system failed miserably.
4.4 The way back from quantitative easing - index linked government bonds
It is a fact that quantitative easing has been used, so one cannot turn the clock back. The “tapering” 
intentions, in order to reduce the volume of quantitative easing injections, have already had a series 
of effects. It has led to capital outflows from emerging market economies. 30 year mortgage rates 
have gone up in the U.S. from 3.54% in May till 4.46% in August this year. As long term fixed 
mortgage rates move up, so do the interest rates that governments have to pay for their fixed rate 
borrowings. The U.S. 10 year fixed rate government bond yield has moved up from its absolute low 
of 1.4% per annum in July 2012 till 2.73% in September 2013.
The implications of such increase in yields are substantial. The existing fixed rate government bond 
portfolio  loses substantial  amounts  in value on a mark to market  basis. In this  connection it  is 
interesting to repeat the conclusions of a study11 made by the U.K.’s Institute of Fiscal Studies in 
2006:
“We think real yields on bonds issued by the UK government are significantly more likely to be 
higher in the future than to stay at current low levels or fall further. Yields on long-dated index-
linked bonds have fallen well under 1%. The UK government may look back in 10 years and regret 
that it issued anything other than long-dated index-linked bonds at yields under 1%. We believe that 
issuing long-dated inflation-proof debt represents a good deal for future taxpayers. It is not that one 
can be sure that we are in the midst of a bond market bubble and that yields have obviously been 
driven well under sustainable levels. Indeed, there are some reasons to believe that sustainable real 
yields may have moved down over the past decade. But the scale of the fall in real yields is so great  
that the risks have now become asymmetric – the chances of real yields going higher from here are 
greater than their going lower. Locking in at today’s low real yields by issuing long-dated indexed 
debt is therefore sensible.”
These findings are even more important now than in 2006. Quantitative easing has taken place and 
in  the  U.S.,  the  U.K.  and  in  the  Euro  zone  countries.  To  avoid  huge  losses  to  all  individual  
households  when  interest  rates  on  government  bonds  will  rise,  as  they  will,  when  no  further 
quantitative easing injections will be given, a switch to index-linked bonds (gilts) is all the more  
desirable.
The next three tables for the U.S., the U.K and The Netherlands show another reason why index-
linked bond issuance is not only vital to individual households in their efforts to save for future 
11 http://www.ifs.org.uk/budgets/gb2006/06chap6.pdf
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income protection, both individually and in the collective form of pension funds, it is also vital to 
government efforts to reduce the costs of servicing government debts.
Take the U.S. case as shown in table 6, over the last twenty years only in three years, 2008, 2011 
and 2012 have the 10 year government bond fixed rate yields been lower than the CPI rate plus 1% 
for the index linked yields. 2008 was unusual in the CPI inflation rate was about 1% higher than in 
2007  and  the  fixed  yields  dropped  due  to  the  financial  crisis.  2011  and  2012  were  strongly 
influenced by quantitative easing exercises. In the U.K. the RPI is used in calculations for the index 
linked gilts. They include mortgage costs and council taxes as compared to CPI and are based on 
different mean values. In 2006, 2007 the RPI values in the U.K. exceeded substantially the CPI 
values of respectively 2.3% and 2.35%. The same applied to 2010 were the CPI value was 3.4%.In 
2011 the CPI was 4.45%, but this was only marginally lower than the RPI. If index linked gilts had 
been based on CPI plus 1% than in all years such index linked gilts would have been cheaper than 
the yield on 10 year  gilts.  The Dutch government  has never issued index-linked bonds, but for 
comparison  sake,  the  CPI  levels  plus  1%  was  used  as  a  comparative  tool.  The  individual; 
households of all  three countries would have been substantially better  off,  if  their  governments 
would have opted for a very sizeable share of total government debt to be funded through index 
linked bonds.
Table 6: The U.S. experience
Year 10 year
Average
Bond yield
%
C.P.I Effective
Yield
%
30 Year
Tips yield
%
Year 10 year
Average
Bond yield
%
C.P.I. Effective
Yield
%
30 year
Tips yield
%
1993 6.26 2.99 3.27 3.99 2004 4.30 2.59 1.77 3.59
1994 6.90 2.56 4.34 3.56 2005 4.13 3.28 0.85 4.28
1995 6.74 2.83 3.91 3.83 2006 4.52 3.12 1.40 4.12
1996 6.07 2.95 3.12 3.95 2007 4.30 2.77 1.53 3.77
1997 6.10 2.29 3.81 3.29 2008 3.18 3.70 -0.52 4.70
1998 5.18 1.53 3.65 2.53 2009 3.16 -0.36 3.52 0.64
1999 5.64 2.16 3.48 3.16 2010 3.60 1.61 1.99 2.61
2000 5.75 3.25 2.50 4.25 2011 2.67 3.06 - 0.39 4.06
2001 5.06 2.77 2.29 3.77 2012 1.92 2.03 -0.11 3.03
2002 4.64 1.56 3.08 2.56 2013
1 July
2.50 1.67 0.83 2.67
2003 4.23 2.23 2.00 3.23
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Table 7: The United Kingdom’s experience.
Year 10 year
Average
Gilt  yield 
%
R.P.I. Effective 
Yield
%
Index
Linked
Gilts 
%
Year 10 year
Average
Gilt yield
%
R.P.I. Effective 
Yield
%
Index 
Linked
Gilts
%
1993 7.69 1.9 5.79 2.1 2004 4.79 3.5 1.29 4.5
1994 8.18 2.9 5.28 3.9 2005 4.45 2.2 2.25 3.2
1995 8.24 3.2 5.04 4.2 2006 4.24 4.4 - 0.16 5.4
1996 8.03 2.5 5.53 3.5 2007 4.62 4.0 0.62 5.0
1997 7.15 3.6 3.55 4.6 2008 4.60 0.9 3.70 1.9
1998 5.59 2.8 2.79 3.8 2009 4.54 2.4 2.14 3.4
1999 4.87 1.8 3.07 2.8 2010 4.66 4.8 - 0.12 5.8
2000 4.93 2.9 2.03 3.9 2011 4.38 4.8 - 0.42 5.8
2001 4.99 0.9 4.09 1.9 2012 3.77 3.1 0.67 4.1
2002 5.04 2.9 2.14 3.9 2013 2.9(est.)
2003 4.87 2.8 2.07 3.8
Table 8: The Netherlands’ experience
Year 5 longest
Dutch
Govt. bond
Yields %
CPI
%
Effective
Yield
%
Index
Linked
Yield
%
Year 5 longest
Dutch
Govt. bond
Yields %
CPI
%
Effective
Yield
%
Index
Linked 
Yield
%
1993 6.69 2.61 4.08 3.61 2004 4.14 1.12 3.02 2.12
1994 7.20 2.64 4.56 3.64 2005 3.44 2.04 1.40 3.04
1995 7.19 1.68 5.51 2.68 2006 3.86 1.00 2.86 2.00
1996 6.49 2.29 4.20 3.29 2007 4.33 1.87 2.46 2.87
1997 5.80 2.32 3.48 3.32 2008 4.36 1.94 2.42 2.94
1998 4.87 1.78 3.09 2.78 2009 4.03 1.11 2.92 2.11
1999 4.92 2.15 2.77 3.15 2010 3.79 1.93 1.86 2.93
2000 5.51 2.60 2.91 3.60 2011 4.31 2.38 1.93 3.38
2001 5.17 4.15 1.02 5.15 2012 3.06 2.90 0.16 3.90
2002 4.99 2.75 2.24 3.75 2013 2.00 (est.)
2003 4.27 1.70 2.57 2.70
 The U.S. and the U.K. have been both heavily involved in quantitative easing activities. For both of 
them the most sensible way out of the low interest rate environment, once quantitative easing has 
been stopped, would be to convert the existing holdings of fixed rate bonds which are held by 
respectively the Federal Reserve Bank and the Bank of England into index-linked bonds and gilts.  
Secondly for a few years their National Debt Issuing institutions could issue index-linked bonds and 
gilts, so that pension funds and individual households would have a chance to build up their stock of 
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such bonds. The Bank of England’s own pension fund has already done so, as it has, according to 
its latest annual report12, 91.9% of all its assets are invested in index-linked instruments: 78.9% in 
gilts plus 13% in corporate index linked bonds.
4.5 Pension funds
In  all  the  three  countries  used  in  the  example,  the  pension  fund  sector  has  taken  on  a  great 
importance. For all these countries the asset values of the pension funds exceed the national debt by 
a substantial margin, especially in The Netherlands. It is in this country where the debate about the 
role and the valuations of the pension savings is the most intense. It is also in this country that the 
SER concluded recently that the nominal interest rate plus fixed risk premium was an inappropriate 
measure for assessing future values of the current assets. It wants to have this method of assessing 
future values changed into a “stable rate of return on shares”. The Dutch Central Bank (DNB) does 
not agree with such methodology due to the high degree of uncertainty about the returns on share 
and bond assets.
Discussions of this type show how difficult it is for experts to agree on a methodology that values 
current assets at future levels. In the above this uncertainty was spelled out for the whole financial  
sector. There is no “price” or “discount rate” which can capture all eventualities, as has been shown 
over the last ten years.
The SER’s assessment that pension funds are by their nature pro-cyclical does not only apply to The 
Netherlands; it applies equally to all other pension saving nations. Pension contributions need to go 
up  in  recession  periods,  either  by  increased  corporate  contributions  in  case  of  defined  benefit 
schemes  or  by  increased  contributions  from  individual  households  in  case  of  the  defined 
contribution schemes. Secondly pension payments to those in retirement will in the best case be 
frozen or even reduced in a recession period. The latter is especially striking in the U.K. where the 
proceeds of pension savings have to be invested in annuity insurance to be bought at the time close 
to retirement. In recession periods the acquired income cash flow is substantially lower than the 
same amount of savings would have bought in good economic times.
The first suggestion to counteract such a pro-cyclical nature cannot be done by pension funds, but 
can be done by governments. Governments can increase the proportion of index-linked government 
bonds to a level much closer to the assets accumulated in their national pension schemes and the 
asset allocation percentage that such pension funds invest in domestic government bonds.
The second suggestion is to turn pension funds from pro-cyclical  savings institutions into anti-
cyclical ones. Economic easing will not only help the performance of pension funds, but also on job 
creation, increasing government revenues and increased economic activity:  GDP growth rates. It 
does need the cooperation of individual households to ensure that income created out of their own 
savings is used as income to be spent in times of recession, rather than turned back into savings.
4.6 The Euro zone countries.
Each country in the Euro zone is different from all others in three major factors: the national home 
mortgage portfolio, the government debt level and the assets accumulated in their national pension 
funds. They may share the same currency, have the same central bank, but individual households in 
the various countries have very different levels of indebtedness or employment status for instance. 
12 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Pages/humanresources/default.aspx
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They also do not share the same inflation level or the same average increase in households’ income 
growth.
For instance the Spanish banking crisis was not caused by any outside factor, but by the Spanish 
banking sector together lending excessively so that 880,000 homes were constructed for which there 
were no buyers. This was clearly a domestically created financial sector problem, which had no 
links to countries outside Spain. The only link was that the currency used was the Euro.
What  EC  policymakers  usually  aim  to  do  is  to  define  common  rules  for  all  member  states.  
Regretfully  in  the financial  sector,  rules  on a national  basis  work better  as each country has a 
different set of parameters which are unique to the country concerned. When one wants to stop 
Spanish  banks  to  overextend  themselves  in  the  home  mortgage  markets,  such  action  does  not 
involve French, German, Italian or Dutch banks for instance. Macro-prudential rules can be set and 
need to be set for each individual country rather than for all Euro zone countries together. This 
applies equally to many other aspects of the financial markets, especially those that affect individual 
households. Economic growth is first and foremost linked with local developments. International 
trade is the only real sector link that involves more than one country, while international capital 
flows constitute the financial sector link. Labour can move across borders, but the reason for this is 
often negative in that there are insufficient job opportunities at home.
It is at times of recession that international capital flows go the least risky country, especially within 
the Euro zone, as no currency risk is involved.  Such capital flows enhance the recession periods for 
the countries involved. International support mechanisms do not focus on the effects on individual 
households  through  unemployment  and  income  growth  below  inflation  levels.  Their  solutions 
emphasize financial flows to governments rather than a savings to income transfer to the individual 
households.
4.7 Preventive measures
    4.7.1 Long term fixed rate mortgages
The  fact  that  banks  are  unable  to  provide  30  year  fixed  rate  mortgages,  due  to  their  funding 
structure and private ownership, should not prevent society from setting up a National Mortgage 
Bank, which could be owned collectively by all individual households. In the U.S. such institutions 
exist already: Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac.
However in line with the above, there are  some system shortcomings in both Fannie Mae and 
Freddy Mac. They are that these two institutions took on the credit risks as well as the funding risks 
on their selected client base, which due to their mandate was to help the lower income classes to 
acquire  homes.  What could be done is  to turn Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac into pure funding 
organisations, without the selection of whom to lend to. Commercial banks could apply, on behalf 
of their clients, for a Fannie Mae or Freddy Mac 30 year fixed rate loan. Such loans would be 
granted on basis of a bank guarantee provided to either institution. Banks would add their credit risk 
margin on top of the funding costs  charged by the two institutions  and the clients  would have 
acquired a 30 year fixed rate mortgage.
Another element which led in 2008 to the government’s rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac was 
that the latter institutions had -just like commercial banks- sold part of their mortgage portfolios as 
Collateralised Debt Obligations. When the financial markets did no longer want to refinance such 
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capital  market  instruments,  Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac ran into liquidity  problems.  Liquidity 
considerations and maturity requirements clashed. In the above described arrangements for funding 
long term fixed rate mortgages, such liquidity requirements would be the banks’ responsibility as 
overseen by the U.S. bank supervisors.
In conclusion, in the U.S. generally and for the individual households in particular, the latter would 
be better off with a mortgage product of a 30 year fixed rate nature, available to anyone whose 
income could  support  the  debt  servicing  of  the  mortgage  without  having  to  rely  on  the  value 
changes in house prices.  Such split  responsibility between the fund providers -Fannie Mae and 
Freddy Mac- and the banking sector as the credit judgment institutions would serve all households 
best in reducing their long term interest rate risks. This does not take away the possibility that banks 
or the shadow banking sector pushes too hard on the sales organisations to sell mortgages. This is 
the subject of the next item.
   4.7.2. How to manage the volume increase in the national home mortgage portfolio
The interest rate setting system as it operates currently through the Federal Open Market Committee 
assesses a price for liquidity in the financial markets. It is not a suitable price indicator for maturity 
or for solvency levels. When Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac attract funds in the same manner as they 
currently  do,  a  cost  of  funds  figure  will  emerge.  This  cost  of  funds  percentage  plus  their 
administration fee, will be the guideline for the cost base charged to the customer. Individual banks 
will add their risk premium to it, which should be a 30 year fixed rate percentage as well. In this 
manner a price will have been established well removed from short term liquidity considerations 
and in line with maturity and solvency requirements.
In case the sales efforts  of home mortgages  are too “successful”,  or in other words exceed the 
income growth capacity of individual households, a traffic light system could be introduced by the 
Fed. Green should stand for please continue,  amber  for slow down and red for a  cash penalty 
system  for  all  banks  and  intermediaries,  including  investment  banks,  which  continue  to  sell 
mortgage risks either to individual households or to the financial markets. If the penalties are set 
high enough, it will force through the message that the national home mortgage portfolio needs 
managing and restraint is needed. The interest rate applied to home mortgage borrowers does not 
change; it is the charge to the sellers of such mortgages which changes.
    4.7.3 Quality control over the national home mortgage portfolio
It matters whether a standard variable rate interest rate structure is sold compared to a 30 year fixed 
rate  structure.  It  matters  whether  there is  a  repayment  plan  or  an interest  only plan.  It  matters 
whether the income of the borrower is checked by outside sources or provided by the borrower 
himself. It matters whether there is a 100% financing of the home, or even more, or whether the 
mortgagee has to take an equity share in the property himself. It matters whether the interest rate 
structure is skewed towards higher future interest payments rather than starting up with the long 
term rate.  The quality  of  the  national  home mortgage  portfolio  changes  through each  of  these 
products. What is important is not to try to micro manage each and every decision by banks in their 
mortgage  offers,  but  to  have  the  powers  to  intervene  if  such  mortgage  offers  substantially 
undermine the overall quality of the national home mortgage portfolio. Again this would be part of 
a new management structure for the national home mortgage portfolio.
     
24
      4.7.4 Turn banks into “true” risk taking companies
In the U.S. banks have already undergone rigorous tests to ensure that they have the capacity to 
absorb any foreseeable future event. However the question may be raised if the current bank equity 
based structure is the most efficient in sharing risks and income between the bank management and 
staff, the owners and the other fund providers.
Banks are different from any other company in that their  assets and liabilities are monies only. 
Their activities are all related to money products, such as lending, trading currencies, trading in 
interest rates and providing other money services. 
The art of risk taking implies that banks are able to predict a future outcome for their loans, for their 
currency and interest  rate  positions  and for their  stock and bond markets  listings,  mergers  and 
acquisitions actions and corporate or government advisory activities and finally for their trading for 
own account.
Two elements set banks apart from ordinary companies. Firstly banks are the originators of debt for 
businesses and individual households. The decision to lend is solely a decision taken by the banks. 
In lending to businesses, banks try to protect themselves from other banks adding more debt to the 
same business. In lending to individual households the market is a free for all.  Secondly banks 
assume from the outset that they have made the right decisions, in other words there will be no loan 
losses or losses to other market participants from their lending, M&A and stock market listings, for 
instance.
Banks and the regulators use the Value at Risk (VaR) approach, which is supposed to predict the 
outcome of  the  decisions  by the  bankers  with  some degree  of  certainty.  Volatility,  worst  case 
scenarios, maximum loss assessments are based on time periods, confidence level and potential loss 
amounts. To give some scant confidence to the markets, one of the VaR assessment methods, which 
is used, is called the Monte Carlo simulation, hence the term casino banking.
“True” risk taking is based on foresight, rather than on adjustable versions which can be changed on 
a daily basis depending on how economic and political factors change. In hindsight it has been clear 
that  the  collective  of  banks  in  a  number  of  countries  created  a  lending  boom  to  individual 
households  which  was  far  in  excess  of  the  average  income  growth  of  these  households.  VaR 
assessments  are made by individual  banks,  not by the collective of banks jointly.  However the 
current economic problems were caused by the collective of banks, including the investment banks.
A way to solve this dilemma between individual and collective actions is to force individual banks 
to set their “foresight” in stone. This can be done by allowing banks to deduct from their profit 
levels an amount of “loss provision” for every loan or other activity at the moment the loan or other  
agreement is signed. In effect the VaR is assessed at the moment of taking the risk and cannot be 
changed later. No excuses for wrong assessments. 
If such VaR assessments are made tax deductible also from the day the loan or other agreement is 
entered into and cannot be changed over the lifetime of the loan or contract, the skills of individual 
banks and their bankers in predicting future outcomes will be reflected in the profit levels made. If 
banks make mistakes by underestimating VaR requirements, than such mistakes would no longer be 
tax deductable; they would have to be funded from the accumulated level of deferred staff bonuses 
and from a write down in the value of shareholders equity. If banks had been too conservative, a 
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freefall of the excess VaR amounts would not be taxed and could be paid to shareholders and to the 
bankers who took the decisions in the past.
This  leads  to  the  concept  of  “shareholders”  in  a  bank.  Banks  are  income  and  expense  based 
institutions, whereby incomes and expenses have all to come from financial assets and liabilities. 
Such  liabilities  include  the  “risk”  taking  category  of  shareholders.  Banks  are  cash-flow based 
institutions and the individual households -or their representatives in the form of pension funds and 
mutual funds- should get priority over bankers’ pay. Their value at risk is the amount of money 
provided to a bank in order to take the risks banks take. The best way to achieve such priority is to  
turn share capital into non-redeemable perpetual notes with pay out an annual fixed rate of return. 
Such notes  could  be  stock market  listed  and the  price  of  such notes  would  reflect  the  market 
perception of the skills of the bankers. Around par or slightly above indicates a well-managed bank. 
A steep discount to par reflects poor bankers’ judgments. More perpetual notes will be needed to 
overcome the unforeseen losses and the price for getting such risk capital will need to go up. All  
regulators need to do is to ensure that banks cannot expand unless their latest perpetual notes issues 
are quoted at around par. Investment banks should be forced to make the same VaR arrangements 
for  their  stock  market  introductions  and  mergers  and  acquisition  activities.  They  make  risk 
assessments that can affect the money put out at  risk by individual households. They -just like 
commercial  bankers-  should  be  held  responsible  for  their  advice  to  the  markets,  in  that  they 
guarantee -over a declining time scale- that their judgments are correct. If not they will need to buy 
back part of the issued stock for instance.
Individually banks make judgments which often affect all banks, but also all fund providers, the 
savers.
5. Conclusions
The first conclusion is that the recession was caused by excessive mortgage lending, excessive as 
compared to income growth of the individual households.
The second conclusion is that not a single bank or financial  institution was responsible, but the 
collective of banks, even those who had sufficient equity capital to absorb the subsequent losses.
The third conclusion is that the real question in managing the national home mortgage portfolio is 
not to bolster the capital ratios of the banks so they can absorb any volume of losses - a noble aim in 
its own right- but to manage the national home mortgage portfolio in relationship with the growth in 
the income levels of individual households. This was not done in the run up to 2008, but can be 
done by a traffic light system for the banks with penalties for excessive speeding.
The fourth conclusion is that individual households will benefit from 30 year fixed rate mortgages. 
Each country can set up a national mortgage bank to provide long term fixed rate funding to the 
national banking sector. The latter will have the client risk and charge customers accordingly.
The fifth conclusion is that financial sector companies are fundamentally different from real sector 
companies. For real sector companies the cost base is based on past expenditure; for financial sector 
companies the true costs of funds will only show up in the future, which may be many years away. 
Future cash flows for financial  sector companies are based on considered opinions of the fund 
managers. They may be right but they may equally be very far removed of the ultimate outcome.
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The sixth conclusion is that the reactions of central banks and governments did not solve the key 
issue caused by the financial crisis: the reduced capacity of the individual households to consume 
goods and services from the real sector. The individual households lost a substantial  number of 
jobs;  they  reduced  their  participation  level  in  the  labour  force;  they  collectively  reduced  their 
mortgages  level  in  order to restore their  own balance  sheets;  they funded new house buildings 
-albeit at a reduced level- from their own income and savings and in the meantime they saw the 
growth in their own income stay behind the inflation levels.
The seventh conclusion is that quantitative easing focussed on the wrong variable: interest rates 
rather than on credit volume growth to individual households. Lower interest rates did not lead to 
more borrowings as the theory suggested, but to more repayments as individual households wanted 
to restore their own balance sheets.
The eighth conclusion is that the way back from quantitative easing -the low interest rate scenario- 
is to increase the volume of index-linked bonds substantially,  partially by swapping the existing 
volumes of fixed interest rate bonds held by central banks into index-linked bonds and partially by 
only issuing new and replacement government debt as index-linked bonds. The experiences over the 
last twenty years show that such issuance is substantially cheaper for governments and taxpayers 
alike.
The ninth conclusion is that there is the opportunity to move much faster to renewed economic 
growth with economic easing.  This method uses a transfer system from existing savings in the 
financial sector to incomes of the individual households without incurring any increase in debts. A 
small part of the pension savings, which are currently locked up through government regulations, 
can be released into individual household incomes. A government short fall guarantee can be issued 
if after say three years the asset base of individual pension funds has not recouped the cash outflow 
through improved share and bond prices. Just like all banks need to cooperate to avoid an excessive 
home mortgage boom, so do all pension funds need to cooperate to make economic easing a success 
to their collective benefit.
The tenth conclusion is related to financial sector companies, including banks. The managers of 
these companies could be forced to put their considered opinions into stone from day one that a 
banking’ or share issue’ or merger and acquisitions’ proposal has been decided upon. All financial 
company shares could be converted into non-redeemable perpetual notes paying a fixed interest rate 
from day one of issue. If managers cannot change the risk provisions for expected doubtful debtors 
or mergers or share IPO’s than their true forecasting skills will come through in the perpetual notes 
prices of the listed instruments. The worst case scenario is a value zero for the perpetual notes. 
Taxation rules could be brought in line with such approach.
Drs Kees De Koning
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